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E conomic T heory 
Heterogeneous Labor, Labor Market Fritions and Employment
Eets of Tehnologial Change

| Theory and Empirial Evidene for the U.S. and Europe |
by
Jens Rubart
z
Darmstadt, January 2006
Abstrat
During the last two deades the so alled IT revolution has led to a di-
verse pattern of growth and employment in OECD ountries. In partiular,
anglo-saxon eonomies like the U.S. or the U.K. exhibited high rates of eo-
nomi performane and low unemployment rates, whereas ontinental Euro-
pean ountries showed low eonomi growth and high unemployment rates.
Based on the ndings of Lindquist (2004) that the relative demand for
workers of dierent skills (measured by the variation of eduational wage dif-
ferenes) varies signiantly over the business yle, we develop a dynami
general equilibrium model whih aounts for skill biased tehnology shoks
as well as for the employment reord of labor whih is divided into dier-
ent ategories of skills. Furthermore, the labor market is haraterized by
searh and mathing fritions whih allows us to analyze dierent kinds of
institutional settings whih determine the negotiated wage rates as well as
the demand for labor of the respetive skill group. In partiular, the latter
assumption enables us to ontrol for stylized fats of ontinental European
labor markets.
By onfronting our theoretial results to empirial evidenes it is shown
that labor market fritions are neessary to reprodue empirial ndings as
the lagged response of output, wages and employment after unantiipated
shoks to tehnology.
JEL - Classiation: E32, J21,J23, J24, J31, J41
Keywords : DGE Model, Heterogenous Labor, Skill Biased Tehnologial Change,
Searh Unemployment
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1 Introdution
During the last deade, main ontinental European ountries are faed with the
dilemma of high and inreasing unemployment rates and, partiularly in the ase
of Germany, low eonomi growth. In ontrast, anglo-saxon ountries, like the U.S.
or the U.K. exhibit dereasing unemployment rates and higher rates of eonomi
growth. In partiular, the rigidity of ontinental European labor markets seen as
the major soure for the inreasing unemployment rates.
1
However, when the unemployment reord is onsidered one is onfronted with
a so-alled two-tier piture onerning the utuation and level of unemployment
rates of dierent groups of workers (see e.g. Saint-Paul (1996)). In general, one
observes an upper tier with high employment (as well as low employment variation)
high wages and high job seurity and a lower tier with high unemployment whih
is also haraterized by high employment variation. As we will show below
2
this
observation holds for the unemployment pattern of high and low skilled workers.
3
A general explanation of this observation, partiularly of the steady inrease in
the unemployment rate of low skilled workers, is given by Krugman (1994) who
states that tehnologial advanes inreased the labor demand for skilled workers,
only, whereas the deline in demand for low skilled workers has led to the steady
inrease of unemployment of this skill group. In addition, this hypothesis ould be
extended by the ndings of Phelps and Zoega (2001) who point out that the ob-
served path of unemployment is, amongst others, subjeted to non-monetary shoks
and developments, mainly due to investment ativities of rms. Considering the
investment per GDP ratio for the U.S., U.K., Frane and Germany one observes a
steady inrease of this ratio from 15% to 19.8% (16.3%) for the U.S. (U.K.) whereas
the same ratio delined from 28.8% (24.1%) to 18.4 % (20.2%) for Germany (Frane)
between 1970 and 2004. However, the fration of investment in new tehnologies,
like information and ommuniation tehnologies exhibit a signiant inrease be-
tween 1980 and 2000, i.e. from 15.2% to 39.9% for the U.S. or from 12.2 to 16.2 %
for Germany.
4
Besides the skill mismath as one soure of the dereasing demand for
low skilled workers, wage rigidities and a ertain degree of labor market inexibility
1
See, e.g. Blanhard and Wolfers (2000) or Hekman (2003) for detailed surveys of the impat
of labor market institutions on the employment reord.
2
See gures 1 and 2 as well as table 1.
3
The problem of dualism and dierent skill groups was already mentioned by Malinvaud (1986).
4
The data are taken from the OECD Main Eonomi Indiators 2005 (Investment / GDP ratio)
and from Colehia and Shreyer (2001) (ICT - Investment / Total Investment).
1
prevented wages to adjust downwards whih also led to the observed inrease in the
unemployment rate of low skilled workers.
5
However, as pointed out by Nikell and
Bell (1995, 1996) time phases exist in whih both unemployment of high and low
skilled workers tend to inrease, an observation whih is not onsistent with skill
biased tehnologial hange as the only soure of the high unemployment rates of
low skilled workers. As emphasized by Nikell and Bell (1995) a detailed analysis of
the onsequenes of a shok on the relative employment status is missing, [...℄ it is
essential to understand the onsequenes for unemployment relativities of a neutral
shok [...℄ .
6
Up to now, the transmission proess of tehnologial advanes to the employment
(unemployment) status of dierent types of workers remains unlear, partiularly
when labor market fritions are taken into aount. The reent paper attempts
to bridge the gap between empirial ndings and theoretial explanations of the
observed unemployment pattern. We ombine the hypothesis of skill biased teh-
nologial hange with the assumption of searh and mathing fritions on the labor
market within a dynami general equilibrium (DGE) model of the business yle.
This allows for the examination of the `transmission mehanism' of tehnologial
advanes as well as it enables us to evaluate the simulation results of the model with
observed business yle evidenes.
The hypothesis of skill biased tehnologial hange (SBTC) and its labor market
impliations are widely disussed by Aemoglu (1999), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) or in the reent paper by Hornstein et al. (2005). However, onentration
on the long-run impat of SBTC (as in Aemoglu (1999)) or rather partial equilib-
rium models as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) whih are often found in the
theoretial approahes seems not suÆient in order to aount for the observed un-
employment pattern. For example, partial equilibrium models do not aount for
apital aumulation and possible substitution eets between ertain variables as,
for example, apital and labor. An explanation of the observed utuations of the
wage spread and the variability of working hours of dierent types of workers within
a DGE framework is presented by Lindquist (2004). Related lines of researh an be
found in the work by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Albreht and Vroman (2002),
Gautier (2002) as well as Pierrard and Sneessens (2003). In partiular, we extend
the work by Gautier (2002) or Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) by introduing apital
5
A reent study of the skill mismath in OECD is given by Petrongolo and Manaorda (1999).
6
Cf. Nikell and Bell (1995): 43.
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aumulation, labor - leisure hoie of the households as well as skill-augmenting
tehnology shoks. The latter assumption enables us to examine the eets of skill
enhaning poliies on the employment status of the respetive skill group. In on-
trast to Gautier (2002) and Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) our model assumes (in
line with Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)) a segmented labor market where skilled
and unskilled workers an only apply for skilled and unskilled jobs, respetively.
This assumption simplies the analysis and is also in line with reent empirial evi-
denes by Gottshalk and Hansen (2003). Our analysis onludes with a omparison
of the obtained results with the outomes a model without labor market fritions.
Furthermore, many empirial evidenes are based on time-invariant examina-
tions whereas the underlying theory is a dynami one. Therefore, by using available
time series of the wage spread, the employment status of dierent skill groups, an in-
diator for tehnologial advanes and the labor market status, a redued form VAR
model is estimated and analyzed onerning the question how shoks in produtiv-
ity (tehnology) and the labor market status determine the relative employment
position and the wage spread. This allows us further to evaluate the theoretial
outomes of the theoretial model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows, setion two presents stylized
fats of the observed employment pattern. Setion three presents the results of a
time series examination for the U.S. and German eonomies, setions four and ve
outline the market struture and the equilibrium solution of the model, in setion
six we disuss the obtained results and setion seven onludes.
2 Some Stylized Fats
As outlined above, a general explanation that oinides with the observed pattern
of the employment status of dierent kinds of workers is the hypothesis of the
so-alled skill-biased tehnologial hange, i.e. that new tehnologies inrease the
demand for skilled workers and lower the demand for low skilled workers although
the supply of skilled workers inreased (see e.g. Autor et al. (1998), Katz and Autor
(1999), or Aemoglu (2002)). Reently, the inreased investment in information and
ommuniation tehnologies are, in general, assumed as suh a major tehnologial
advane. The most important indiator of the existene of skill biased tehnologial
hange is the inrease of the wage spread between high and low skilled workers.
Table 1 below, summarizes the main arguments of the SBTC - hypothesis for four
3
OECD ountries. It is obvious that most of the variation in unemployment rates
is found for the group of low skilled workers, whereas the unemployment rate for
high skilled is rather onstant or dereasing. Furthermore, for any ountry we nd
an inrease in the supply of high skilled workers as well as a onstant or inreasing
pattern of the wage spread.
7
Table 1: Eduation, Employment and Demand for Skills
Unemployment Labour Fore Partiipation Supply and Demand for Skills
total less upper tertiary less upper tertiary degrees in wage spread
seondary seondary seondary seondary tert. edu. OECD
a
own al.
Frane
1971-82 { | | | | | | | | |
1982 7.7 | | | | | | 8.3 1.94 |
1988 9.9 | | | | | | 11.8 1.99 |
1995 11.6 14.0 8.9 6.5 60.3 82.8 87.7 | 1.99 |
2002 8.9 11.8 6.8 5.2 65.7 81.5 89.1 12.0 | |
Germany
1971-82 3.1 | 6.4 1.7 | | | | | |
1982 5.7 | | | | | | 7.4 1.63 1.49
1988 6.2 13.7 6.9 7.2 45.8 61.9 78.8 9.4 1.62 1.51
1995 8.2 13.3 7.9 4.9 56.8 77.1 88.5 13.0 1.61 1.50
2002 8.7 15.3 9.0 4.5 60.1 77.3 87.5 13.0 | 1.54
U.K.
1971-82 5.0 | 7.5 2.4 | | | | | |
1982 10.3 | | | | | | 12.0 1.74 |
1988 8.7 13.1 7.4 6.7 75.5 80.5 87.3 18.3 1.82 |
1995 8.7 12.2 7.4 3.7 61.8 82.1 88.8 | 1.87 |
2002 5.1 8.5 4.1 2.4 57.8 82.7 90.0 18.0 | |
U.S.
1971-82 4.9 | 7.8 2.0 | | | | | |
1982 9.7 | | | | | | 16.6 1.79 1.66
1988 5.5 10.1 5.9 3.0 43.8 69.9 78.2 21.5 1.88 1.81
1995 5.5 10.0 5.0 2.7 59.8 79.1 88.2 24.0 2.10 1.98
2002 5.8 10.2 5.7 3.0 63.5 78.5 85.7 28.0 | 2.00
Soures: Greiner et al. (2004), Nikell and Bell (1996), OECD (1989), OECD (1993),
OECD (1996), OECD (2003), OECD (2004)
a
Measured as ratio of the D9/D5 earnings.
Although table 1 might lead to the onlusion that the onsidered variables un-
derly a steady evolution, it is shown by gures 1 and 2 below that ylial variations
and business yle frequenies are at hand. Furthermore, the two-tier hypothesis
7
See appendix A for further information onerning the used data.
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of Saint-Paul (1996) is veried, i.e. we observe a signiant low variation in the
unemployment rate for skilled workers than for unskilled workers.
Figure 1: Germany, 1973.4-2004.4
Soure: Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforshung,
own alulation
Figure 2: U.S., 1993.1-2004.4
Soure: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistis
own alulation
Conerning the main indiator of skill-biased tehnologial hange, the inrease
of the wage dierential, the time series of the wage spread (gures 3 and 4) indiates
a ylial pattern at business yle frequenies, too.
Figure 3: Germany, 1973.4-2004.4
Soure: Federal Statistial OÆe Germany,
own alulation
Figure 4: U.S., 1963.1-2004.4
Soure: U.S. Bureau of the Census, CPS Marh 2003
own alulation
Beside the evidenes of supply and demand shifts for dierent types of work-
ers, labor market institutions an not be negleted in the analysis. The bargaining
strength of trade unions and the soial seurity system whih determines the reser-
vation wages of unemployed workers are generally treated as important institutional
harateristis of labor markets. Table 2 below outlines the bargaining strength of
the workers measured by union density, i.e. the ratio of employees organized in
5
trade unions per total employees, and the overage of entralized wage bargaining.
Furthermore, the measures by Dolado et al. (1996) outline the generosity of the
soial benet system.
Table 2: Union Density, Bargaining Coverage and Minimum Wages
Year U.S. U.K. Germany Frane
Trade Union Density
1960 0.29 0.45 0.35 0.20
1980 0.23 0.56 0.35 0.19
1995 0.15 0.37 0.27 0.10
2002 0.13 0.31 0.25 0.10
Bargaining Coverage
1980 0.26 0.70 0.91 0.85
1995 0.18 0.47 0.92 0.95
2002 0.14 0.33 0.67 0.93
Minimum Wages
a
0.39 0.40 0.55 0.50
(1993) (1993) (1991) (1993)
Soure: Bierhanzl and Gwartney (1998), Dolado et al. (1996), OECD (2004)
a
Minimum wages as a fration of average earnings (Dolado et al. (1996): 321).
Although labor market institutions are important for the labor market outome,
it is obvious that the impat of labor market institutions dereased during the 1990's,
in partiular for the German eonomy.
3 Empirial Analysis
The main indiator of skill biased tehnologial hange is, as for example outlined
by Aemoglu (2002), the inreased wage dierential between high and low skilled
workers after a rise in the supply of skilled workers. In this setion we try to examine
the dynami eets as outlined above within an empirial framework.
The above mentioned relation is aptured by the following equation whih relates
the spread of wages, w
i
, earned by workers of dierent skill groups, n
i
with i =
(s)killed, (u)nskilled, to variables desribing tehnologial advanes as well as the
relative supply of skilled workers. Following the approahes by Murphy et al. (1998)
or Greiner et al. (2004) and assuming a CES prodution tehnology, this relation
6
an be written as follows (see, for example, eqn. (26), below):
w
sp
=
w
s
t
w
u
t
=

1  
 z
t
("
s
 "
u
)

n
s;t
n
u;t

 
1

; (1)
where  denotes the inome share of eah type of labor, z
t
gives the level of teh-
nology, "
s
; "
u
determine an external eet of tehnology on the produtivity of eah
type of labor and  denotes the elastiity of substitution between both types of
labor servies. Rewriting eqn. (1) in logarithms a linear representation of the wage
spread is obtained
w^
sp
=
^

0
+ (
h
  
u
)x^
t
 
1

n^
t
; (2)
with
^

0
= ln(

1 
), z^
t
= ln(z
t
) and n^
t
= ln(n
s;t
)  ln(n
u;t
). Variations of equation (2)
are at the enter of many empirial examinations, for example by Katz and Murphy
(1992), Katz and Autor (1999), or Krusell et al. (2000).
In order to derive a dynami framework, equation (2) will be rewritten as a VAR
representation, whih we will be speied and estimated with a indiators of teh-
nologial hange and the state of the labor market. With the obtained estimations
we derive impulse response funtions to simulate the eets of an innovation in the
supply of skilled labor and tehnology on the wage spread. Finally, the aggregate
vaany - unemployment ratio, 
t
will be onsidered as an indiator of the labor
market position as well as the inuene of wage setting institutions.
A general redued form VAR representation of equation (2) reads as follows,
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0
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A
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where A
0
denotes a j  1 vetor of interept terms as well as A
i
, for i = 1; :::; p,
are j  j are matries of oeÆients of endogenous lagged variables. Note that,
j equals the number of assumed variables. Furthermore, B denotes the matrix of
oeÆients of the exogenous variable 
t
.
The variable of tehnologial hange is measured by the index of labor produ-
tivity. In this analysis labor produtivity is measured as output per employee rather
than output per hour. Although the latter measure should be used, output per
employee is taken beause of the availability of omparable data sets.
9
In addition,
8
A detailed desription of estimating VAR models an be found in Hamilton (1994) or Lutkepohl
and Kratzig (2004).
9
The data are based on own alulations (wage spread, relative employment) as well as on
data taken from the OECD Statistial Compendium, OECD Eonomi Outlook, 2005. A detailed
desription of the data used in this setion an be found in appendix A.
7
the above VAR is extended by the so-alled labor market tightness, i.e. the vaany
- unemployment ratio.
10
Although this ratio does not measure the inuene of labor
market institutions diretly, it is an important variable determining the bargaining
power when during negotiation proedures and also aptures strutural imbalanes.
The properties of the time series are summarized in table 9 (Appendix B). The
results indiate non-stationary behavior of the time series in levels, whereas no
unit roots are not found when rst dierenes are taken into aount. For the
so-alled labor market tightness, measured by the v=u - ratio, the hypothesis of
a unit root is generally rejeted. Although the existene of unit roots allows for
ointegration of the variables, however, we follow the approah outlined by Sims et al.
(1990) and speify and estimate VAR models in levels. This leads to ineÆient but
onsistent estimates, whereas a false speiation of ointegration relations might
lead to inonsistent estimates.
For the subsequent estimations of the VAR model as desribed by eqn. (3), a gen-
eral lag length of two is hosen. This seems suÆient beause a higher lag order goes
hand in hand with unstable impulse response funtions whih indiates overspei-
ed models.
11
After estimating the respetive models the innovations of eah VAR
are orthogonalized by using a Cholesky deomposition of the variane-ovariane
matrix. This representation allows, aording to Sims (1980), the determination
of impulse response funtions whih will be onsidered for the examination of the
impats of tehnologial advanes on relative employment and the wage spread.
Aording to Aemoglu (1998) an inrease of the relative supply of skilled workers
should derease the wage premium in the short run whereas indued tehnologial
hange inventive ativities inreases the demand for skilled workers in the long run
and, therefore, leads to an inrease of the wage premium.
12
In general, whether
the hypothesis of skill biased tehnologial hange, as outlined by Aemoglu (1998),
is valid we should observe a negative response of the wage spread to a shok in
the relative supply of skills. Furthermore, an innovation of eonomi ativity or
tehnologial advanes should lead after a while to an inrease of the wage spread.
By taking the v=u ratio as an exogenous indiator of the labor market position
10
A redued form VAR approah to examine maroeonomi poliies under labor market fritions
an be found, for example, in Yashiv (2004). In addition, more sophistiated VAR models of labor
market ows an be found in Blanhard and Diamond (1989) or Balakrishnan and Mihelai
(2001). In partiular, the latter study onentrates on job reation and job destrution dynamis
in main OECD ountries.
11
The proposed speiations of the VAR model are outline in table 10 in appendix B.
12
Cf. Aemoglu (1998): 1057.
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one should expet a negative orrelation between the wage spread as well as the
relative employment position and the v=u ratio. An inrease of the v=u-ratio should
strengthen the bargaining power of workers (and of the trade unions) whih should
lead to a onstant or even negative response of the wage spread. An inrease in the
market tightness inreases the probability to nd a job for both types of workers.
Beause of the greater availability of unemployed low skilled workers, an inrease in
the latter ratio should lead to a higher inrease of low skilled employment relative
to the employment of skilled workers.
Table 3: Estimation Results, U.S. 1972.1-1998.4
Variable Deterministi Endogenous lagged Exogenous
Terms Variables Variable
onst. Trend w
s
=w
u
(t  1) n
s
=n
u
(t   1) X(t   1) v=u(t   1)
w
s
=w
u
0.2417 -0.00001 1.7279 0.0287 0.0666 0.0014
(1.7164) (-0.0423) (25.448) (0.6434) (1.025) (0.9334)
t   2
-0.7693 -0.0093 -0.1187
(-11.2743) (-0.2319) (-1.7666)
n
s
=n
u
-0.5220 0.0021 -0.0077 1.4376 -0.0311 -0.0060
(-2.2917) (6.0350) (-0.0696) (19.8930) (-0.2959) (-2.3850)
t   2
-0.0061 -0.6510 0.0468
(-0.5497) (-9.8833) (0.4420)
t-statistis in parentheses.
Signiane: 10%: 1.658; 5%: 1.980 (f. Mood et al. (1974): 556.)
For the U.S., the results presented in table 3 show, at rst, a onstant and a
signiant trend in the wage spread. However, the impat of the relative supply of
employees reat in aordane to the theoretial explanation, i.e. a negative response
in the period t  1 however sign hanges when further lags are onsidered. On the
other hand the evolution of the relative employment status is almost explained by
lagged values of this variable.
The latter observation is also made for the German eonomy (see table 4, below).
In ontrast to the U.S., the interept term and the time trend for the wage spread
turned out to be signiant for the German data. Furthermore, the relationships
between inequality and relative employment behave similarly for both eonomies.
In partiular, a signiant negative oeÆient between the labor market status and
relative employment is found for both eonomies.
9
Table 4: Estimation Results, Germany 1975.1-2000.1
Variable Deterministi Endogenous lagged Exogenous
Terms Variables Variable
onst. Trend w
s
=w
u
(t  1) n
s
=n
u
(t   1) X(t   1) v=u(t   1)
w
s
=w
u
-0.0640 -0.0001 1.6610 0.0049 0.0102 0.0002
(-2.5274) (-2.4670) (27.1022) (0.3380) (1.0539) (1.056)
t   2
-0.6507 0.0055 0.0053
(-9.7961) (0.3839) (0.5525)
n
s
=n
u
0.0942 0.0003 -0.0793 1.6062 -0.0394 -0.0021
(0.7909) (2.2767) (-0.2751) (23.4824) (-0.8700) (-2.2964)
t   2
-0.1214 -0.7178 0.0215
(-0.3885) (-10.5888) (0.4725)
t-statistis in parentheses.
Signiane: 10%: 1.658; 5%: 1.980 (f. Mood et al. (1974): 556.)
In a further step, the obtained estimation results are used to derive impulse
response funtions whih outline the dynami eets of innovations in seleted vari-
ables.
Figures 5 and 6 below show the responses of an innovation in tehnology alu-
lated for a 10-year period for the U.S. eonomy.
13
Figure 5: Responses of U.S. wage inequality
13
Please note that the solid lines represent the point estimate of the impulse response funtion.
The dashed lines show the 95% ondene interval, obtained from a simulation based Bootstrap-
Distribution (1000 repliations).
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Figure 6: Responses of relative employment, U.S.
The main ndings for the U.S. eonomy are that an inrease in the relative
number of skilled workers leads to a inrease in the wage spread for ten quarters and
whih, however, turns negative afterwards (gure 5, left). This nding is onsistent
with the results shown by gure 6. There, an inrease in tehnology leads to a
inrease in the relative employment position after the fourth period. When the
response of the wage spread on a tehnology shok is onsidered (gure 5, right),
only a small positive response is obtained, after the fourth period the response of
inequality turns negative. However, the negative trend hanges after the period of
four years. In general, the empirial results for the U.S. eonomy are in line with
the theoretial preditions of, for example,Aemoglu (1998). In partiular, for the
onsidered time interval, the so-alled supply eet of an inrease in the supply of
skilled workers is reprodued by the empirial results.
Figure 7: Responses of wage inequality, Germany
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Figure 8: Responses of relative employment, Germany
In ontrast to the U.S. the results for Germany report a positive response of wage
inequality to an inrease in the relative supply of skilled workers (gure 7) as well
as a positive response of the wage spread on an inrease in tehnology. However,
beause of the ondene intervals inlude the null after the forth year, negative
responses annot be exluded. Conerning the eets of an inrease in tehnology,
the positive eet on the wage spread is muh more persistent than reported for the
U.S. (ompare gures 5 (right), 7 (right)). However, the same innovation leads to
a redution in the relative employment position of skilled workers (gure 8). The
latter eet might be due to the fat that in Germany a suessful institution of
pratial eduation exists, rather than in the U.S..
As shown by the empirial analysis, there is a dierent behavior of wage in-
equality and relative employment in response to advanes in tehnology when we
ompare the U.S. and Germany. In the U.S. tehnology shoks lead to rather instan-
taneous improvements in employment, whereas we observe reations in wages (and
the wage spread) than in employment. The latter eet might be explained by the
high bargaining power and the overage of wage agreements in Germany, i.e. gains
from improvements in produtivity result in higher wages than in higher employ-
ment.
14
Therefore, it seems questionable whether a DGE framework with perfet
labor markets, as for example assumed by Lindquist (2004), is able to aount for
the empirial observation.
14
See, e.g. Blanhard and Wolfers (2000) for a survey on the impat of labor market institutions
on ontinental European unemployment.
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4 The Model
Market struture of the Model
The model disussed in this paper is based on the seminal work by Kydland (1984),
Merz (1995) and on suggestions made by Cahu and Zylberberg (2004) as well as
Hekman et al. (1998). The model eonomy onsists of two setors, a household
setor whih supplies labor and physial apital to the prodution setor. The labor
fore is dierentiated into two skill groups, high and low skilled workers, whih are
assumed to be imperfet substitutes in prodution. The prodution setor onsists
of many small rms using apital and both types of labor servies in order to produe
a single good whih an be either onsumed or invested. The market for nal goods
is haraterized by perfet ompetition, whereas the labor market is haraterized
by searh and mathing fritions. It is assumed that jobs for high and low skilled
workers are destroyed in any period at an exogenous rate  
i
2 (0; 1) with i = s; u.
Furthermore, we assume a two sided searh proess, i.e. both unemployed workers
of eah skill group (s=skilled, u=unskilled) and rms with vaant jobs seek for new
job mathes.
The Labor market
The eonomy's labor fore is assumed to be onstant and is normalized to one. Let
n
i;t
denote the ratio of labor of the skill group i = s; u, i.e. N = 1 = l
s
+ l
u
.
Eah type of labor an either be employed or unemployed, i.e. l
i
= h
i
+ u
i
. The
employment of eah skill group evolves aording to
h
s;t+1
= (1   
s
)h
s;t
+M
s;t
(4)
h
u;t+1
= (1   
u
)h
u;t
+M
u;t
; (5)
where  
i
2 (0; 1) denotes an exogenous rate of job destrution and M
i;t
gives the
number of newly reated jobs in period t. New job mathes are reated through a
`standard' mathing tehnology,
M
i
= M(s
i;t
u
i;t
; v
i;t
): (6)
For simpliity it is assumed that both skill groups are separated from eah other,
i.e. low skilled workers an not apply for high skilled jobs and vie versa. The
mathing tehnology given by eqn. 6 implies the following transition probabilities
13
from unemployment to employment and from an unlled to a lled job vaany of
type i:
p
i;t
=
M
i;t
s
i;t
(1  h
i;t
)
(7)
q
i;t
=
M
i;t
v
i;t
: (8)
The market tightness for eah type of worker, 
i
, follows as

s;t
=
v
s;t
(1  h
s;t
)
(9)

u;t
=
v
u;t
(1  h
u;t
)
: (10)
With the denition li; t = u
i;t
+ h
i;t
the respetive employment and unemployment
rates of eah skill group follow as
~
h
i;t
= h
i;t
=l
i;t
and ~u
i;t
= u
i;t
=l
i;t
, i.e.
~u
i;t
= 1 
~
h
i;t
: (11)
The household setor
We assume a representative household with many inhabitants. For simpliity, the
total number of the household's members is normalized to one. The household
hooses investment in physial apital, I
t
, and the searh intensities, s
i;t
of the
respetive skill group in order to maximize the present disounted value of its life-
time utility. Household's members reeive inome from lending apital to rms at
the interest rate r
t
and from having a fration of both types of its members n
i;t
work
at the respetive wage rates w
i;t
. The households maximization problem reads as
follows:
U
t
= max

t
;s
i;t
;k
t+1
;h
i;t+1
1
X
t=0

t
U(
t
; h
s;t
; h
u;t
) (12)
subjet to

t
+ I
t
+
X
i

i
(s
i;t
)(1  h
i;t
) =
X
i
w
i;t
h
i;t
+ r
t
k
t
(13)
k
t+1
= (1  Æ)k
t
+ I
t
(14)
h
s;t+1
= (1   
s
)h
s;t
+ p
s;t
s
s;t
(1  h
s;t
) (15)
h
u;t+1
= (1   
u
)h
u;t
+ p
u;t
s
u;t
(1  h
u;t
); (16)
where 
t
; k
t
; r
t
; h
i;t
denote onsumption, physial apital, the interest rate, and the
respetive type of labor. Furthermore, s
i;t
;  
i
and p
i;t
represent the searh intensity,
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the rate of job destrution and the rate an unemployed workers nds a new job. The
osts of an unemployed worker of type i for searhing for a new job is given by the
funtion 
i
(s
i;t
). If a job is produtive, the worker of type i reeives a negotiated
wage w
i;t
(see below). Furthermore, it is assumed that the dierent types of workers
pool their inomes whih leads to a perfet insurane against the loss of inome
during unemployment.
The prodution setor
FollowingMerz (1995) rms hoose the plans for the amount of apital they rent from
households and for the number of vaanies, v
i;t
they post at onstant vaany ost a
i
in order to maximize the present disounted value of their stream of future prots.
Firms sell their output y
t
at a prie that is normalized to one. The prodution
fators, apital and labor are bought at the interest rate r
t
and the wage rate w
i;t
,
respetively. The rm's deision problem follows as
max
k
t
;v
t
E
t
1
X
t=0

t

t

t
(17)
subjet to
h
s;t+1
= (1   
s
)h
s;t
+ q
s;t
v
s;t
(18)
h
u;t+1
= (1   
u
)h
u;t
+ q
u;t
v
u;t
: (19)
Note that 
t
denotes the rms prots, i.e.

t
= f(k
t
; h
s;t
; h
u;t
; z
t
) 
X
i
w
i;t
h
i;t
  r
t
k
t
 
X
i
a
i
V
i;t
(20)
The prodution tehnology is assumed aording to Hekman et al. (1998). This
aptures two important eets, rst the assumption of imperfet substitution be-
tween the dierent kinds of labor, a rather standard assumption in the literature of
skill biased tehnologial hange, and, furthermore, imperfet substitution between
labor and physial apital. The latter assumption aounts for the fat that, in
the short run, labor an not be substituted by apital immediately.
15
Aording to
Greiner et al. (2004) the prodution tehnology is further augmented by positive
externalities of tehnologial hange, "
s
; "
u
> 0,
f() = z
t



(z
"
s
t
h
s;t
)

1
+ (1  )(z
"
u
t
h
u;t
)

1


2

1
+(1  )k

2
t

1

2
(21)
15
See also Rowthorn (1999) for a study onerning imperfet apital labor substitution in business
yle models.
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where z
t
denotes a shok in tehnology whih aets overall produtivity as well
as the individual produtivity of eah skill group due to an external eet whih
is aptured by the assumption of "
i
> 0. Furthermore,  denotes the labor share
of total inome. The parameters 
1
and 
2
determine the substitution elastiities
between both types of workers as well as between labor and physial apital.
The tehnology shok, z
t
is assumed to follow a stationary stohasti proess
whih is desribed by the following law of motion:
z
t+1
= !z
t
+ 
z
t+1
; (22)
with 
z
t
 i:i:d: N (0; 
2
z
) and ! 2 [0; 1℄.
Wage Setting and Inequality
The wage is negotiated aording to a Nash bargaining proedure one rms and
workers meet in order to form a produtive job. During this proess rms and
workers are onsidered as monopolists earning an eonomi rent if a job beomes
produtive. Therefore, this bargaining sheme alloates the rent surplus of a pro-
dutive job between rms and workers.
16
For a worker of type i who mathes to
a rm, the value of a job is given by the real wage w
i;t
net of osts of searh and
disutility of work. For a rm, the value of a lled job follows from the dierene
between a worker's marginal produt, the wages and the rm's advertising osts.
17
The net surplus of the household is given by
W
h
i
= w
i;t
+ 
i
(s
i;t
)  u
i
t
(
t
; h
i;t
) +

s
i
;i
(s
i;t
)
p
i;t
(1   
i
  p
i;t
s
i;t
):
Note that the workers's surplus onsists of the wage rate, the searh osts of the
urrent and the next period net the disutility of work. The net surplus of the rm
is given by
W
f
= f
h
i
()  w
i;t
+
a
i
q
i;t
(1   
i
):
The Nash bargaining riterion is given by
w
t
= argmax
 
W
h
i


i
 
W
f

1 
i
; (23)
16
\Hene a realized job math yields some pure eonomi rent, whih is equal to the sum of
the expeted searh osts of the rm and the worker. Wages need to share this eonomi (loal
monopoly) rent, in addition to ompensating eah side for its osts from forming the job." See
Pissarides (2000): 15.
17
Please note that subsripts exept i and t; t+ 1 denote partial derivatives.
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where 
i
denotes the bargaining strength of the worker. The wage results as:
w
i;t
= 
i
"
f
h
i
(k
t
; h
s;t
; h
u;t
; z
t
) +
X
i
a
i

i;t
#
+ (1  
i
)

U
h
i;t
()

t
  
i
(s
i;t
)

: (24)
As in Merz (1995) the wage results as a weighted sum of the marginal produt of
labor net of advertising osts and the disutility of work orreted for foregone searh
osts.
The wage spread due to the skill dierenes between both types of workers follows
as
w
h
w
u
=

h
h
f
h
s
() + a
s

s;t
i
+ (1  
h
)
h
U
h
s
()

  
s
s
(s
s;t
)
i

u
h
f
h
u
() + a
u

u;t
i
+ (1  
u
)
h
U
h
u
()

  
s
u
(s
u;t
)
i
(25)
For omparison, if we would onsider a model with a perfet labor market wage
inequality is given by:
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w
h
w
u
=

1  

z
"
h
z
"
u


1

h
u
h
s

1 
1
(26)
Comparing equations (25) and (26) it is obvious that wage inequality resulting in
the reent model does not depend on the prodution tehnology, external eets
of knowledge and the rate of substitution between dierent skill groups alone. An
important determinant of the pattern of wage inequality is given by the bargaining
power of workers, 
i
whih governs the fration of the rm's surplus is distributed
to the worker. Furthermore, as an be seen easily, eqns (25) and (26) oinide in
the ase when 
i
onverges to 1 and when no osts of vaany reation would be
assumed. Beside the fat, that the workers disutility of work and his searh osts are
introdued in the wage equation, an important fator whih determines inequality
(as well as the wage setting) is the workers bargaining power 
i
.
5 Equilibrium Solution and Calibration
Aording to Langot (1995) the symmetri general equilibrium solution is obtained
as follows: at rst the optimal job searh and vaany reation behavior is omputed,
furthermore the wage rate is determined within a Nash-bargaining framework. Se-
ond, market learing onditions in the good and apital markets are imposed. How-
ever, beause the wage is not the prie whih lears, for example a Walrasian labor
18
A similar expression is obtained by Greiner et al. (2004).
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market, the solution of this problem is not a Pareto optimum.
19
Please note, that
due to the time onsuming mathing proess on the labor market, this market is
haraterized by a stohasti rationing pattern, i.e. there is a positive probability
1  q(
i
) that a hiring rm does not nd a worker and a probability 1  
i
q(
i
) that
an unemployed worker does not nd a vaant job position.
20
An equilibrium of this
eonomy is a set of variables


t
=

k
t+1
; h
s;t+1
; h
u;t+1
; s
s;t
; s
u;t
; p
s;t
; p
u;t
; q
s;t
; q
u;t
;M
s;t
;
M
u;t
; v
s;t
; v
u;t
; u
s;t
; u
u;t
; 
t
; y
t
; I
t
; r
t
; w
s;t
; w
u;t
; 
h;t

u;t
; z
t
; z
t
; ~z
t
	
whih is determined by the household's and the rm's Euler equations as well as the
respetive resoure onstraints.
The households maximization problem given by equations (12)-(16) lead to the
following Euler equations
E
t
n
U

(
t+1
)
U

(
t
)
(1 + r
t+1
  Æ)
o
= 1 (27)
E
t
n
 U
h
s
(h
s;t
) + 
t+1
(w
s;t+1
h
s;t+1
+ 
s
(s
s;t+1
))+

h
s
;s
(s
s;t+1
)
p
s;t+1

t+1
(1   
s
  p
h;t+1
s
s;t+1
)
o
 

h
s
;s
(s
s;t
)
t
p
s;t
= 0 (28)
E
t
n
 U
h
u
(h
u;t
) + 
t+1
(w
u;t+1
h
u;t+1
+ 
u
(s
u;t+1
))+

h
u
;u
(s
u;t+1
)
p
u;t+1

t+1
(1   
u
  p
u;t+1
s
u;t+1
)
o
 

h
u
;u
(s
u;t
)
t
p
u;t
= 0; (29)
note that 
t
denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the household's optimization prob-
lem.
The rm's deision problem whih is given by equations (17) - (19) lead to
f
k
()  r
t
= 0 (30)

t
a
s

t+1
q
s;t
  E
t
n
f
h
s
()  w
s;t+1
+
a
s
q
s;t+1
(1   
s
)
o
= 0 (31)

t
a
u

t+1
q
u;t
  E
t
n
f
h
u
()  w
u;t+1
+
a
u
q
u;t+1
(1   
u
)
o
= 0: (32)
The equilibrium is determined by the household's and the rm's Euler equations
(27)-(32), as well as equations (6), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (14), (21), (22),
(24) and the aggregate resoure onstraint whih is given by

t
+ I
t
+ 
s
(s
s;t
) + 
u
(s
u;t
) + a
s
v
s;t
+ a
u
v
u;t
= y
t
: (33)
19
Cf. Langot (1995): 297.
20
Cf. Pissarides (2000): 7.
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In order to solve and to alibrate the model we have to speify the funtional forms
of the household's utility funtion, the funtions of searh osts, the prodution and
the mathing tehnologies
U(
t
; h
s;t
; h
u;t
) =

1 
t
1  
 
h
1+
s
s;t
1 + 
s
 
h
1+
u
u;t
1 + 
u
(34)

s
(s
s;t
) = 
s
s

s;t
(35)

u
(s
u;t
) = 
u
s

u;t
: (36)
The aggregate prodution funtion was already introdued by equation (21):
f() = z
t



(z
"
s
t
h
s;t
)

1
+ (1  )(z
"
u
t
h
u;t
)

1


2

1
+(1  )k

2
t

1

2
(37)
in order to study the eets of skill augmenting tehnology shoks we rewrite eqn.
(37) to
f() = z
t



(z
"
s
t
h
s;t
)

1
+ (1  )(~z
"
u
t
h
u;t
)

1


2

1
+(1  )k

2
t

1

2
(38)
where we assume that the two skill-augmenting tehnology shoks, z
t
; ~z
t
follow un-
orrelated stationary stohasti proesses.
The mathing tehnologies are speied analogue to Merz (1995) or Pierrard and
Sneessens (2003)
M
s;t
= v

1
s;t
(s
s;t
 u
s;t
)
(1 
1
)
(39)
M
u;t
= v

2
u;t
(s
u;t
 u
u;t
)
(1 
2
)
; (40)
with 
1
; 
2
2 [0; 1℄.
The alibration is hosen in aordane with the literature. The parameters of
the utility funtion as well as searh and advertising osts are taken from Merz
(1995). One should note that it is assumed that rms have higher advertising osts
if they look for high skilled workers and that low skilled workers have higher searh
osts than workers of the other skill group.
The levels of employment as well as the unemployment rates of the dierent skill
groups, ~u
i
, are hosen aording to the empirial evidene as reported by table 1,
i.e. total unemployment of the respetive skill group follows as: u
i
= h
i
 ~u
i
. The
elastiity of substitution between both types of labor servies, 
1
, is hosen analogue
to Hekman et al. (1998) who estimated an elastiity of 1.4, furthermore we follow
their empirial results of a elastiity of substitution between apital and labor whih
19
is lose to 1. The external eets of new tehnologies are speied in line with the
results of Greiner et al. (2004). The values of the worker's bargaining power 
i
are
hosen in a way that both rms and work share the surplus of a produtive job
equally whih oinides, in general, with the results of a entralized wage bargaining
whih is often found in ontinental European ountries. The parameters of the
mathing tehnologies as well as the searh osts are hosen in aordane to Merz
(1995) and Pierrard and Sneessens (2003), in general we assume that a skilled worker
has lower searh osts than an low skilled worker and for the rm we assume the
opposite ase, i.e. it is more expensive to hire a worker with a university degree than
a worker without suh a degree. Although the quarterly job destrution rate for
the German manufaturing setor is reported between 3-4%, lower job destrution
rates (between 1 and 2 %)are hosen whih are in aordane to German Panel Data
estimates as well as the ndings of Ridder and van den Berg (2003). There, aggregate
job destrution rates are reported between 1-2%.
21
The destrution rates used for
the alibration are hosen in aordane to the latter observation. Furthermore, we
assume, for simpliity, that the produtivity shoks follow the same autoregressive
proess.
Table 5: Parameter Settings
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For the subsequent analysis the steady state of the deterministi part of the model
is omputed numerially by a Newton-Raphson method provided by DYNARE
22
.
The impulse response funtions rely on a rst order approximation of the stohasti
model around its steady state.
21
The measures for the manufaturing setor are based on job ow data taken from the Bun-
desagentur fur Arbeit (WZ93/BA). Many thanks to Alfred Garlo for his suggestions onerning
German job destrution rates.
22
Dynare is a pre-proessor and a olletion of MATLAB or SCILAB routines whih solve non{
linear models with forward looking variables. See http://www.epremap.nrs.fr/dynare/. See
Juillard (1996) for details.
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6 Model Disussion
The rst model we disuss in this setion is a model without labor market fritions
and also exhibits no wage bargaining.
23
In partiular, this model follows the DGE
model by Lindquist (2004). However, wage inequality is determined by skill-biased
tehnology shoks in ontrast to Lindquist (2004) who assumes apital-skill om-
plementarity. In addition, we assume imperfet apital - labor substitution as in
Hekman et al. (1998) (see eqn. (21)). This proeed avoids the introdution of dif-
ferent kinds of apital goods, like strutures and equipment apital as in Lindquist
(2004).
We rst examine the eet of an overall tehnology shok (gure 9, solid line).
This shok might be interpreted as the introdution of a general purpose tehnol-
ogy whih inreases the produtivity of both kinds of workers, however at dierent
magnitudes. The inrease in tehnology leads to an immediate positive response
of output, onsumption and the employment of both skill groups as well as the re-
spetive wages (not reported here). However, the impat of a neutral produtivity
shok on output is rather low. Signiant higher responses are obtained obtained
for shoks whih inrease the individual produtivity of workers. However, the ob-
tained output responses do not show any delayed adjustment proesses as it should
be expeted, for example.
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Figure 9: Model I, Output Responses of Asymmetri Tehnology Shoks
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Beside the work of Lindquist (2004) the general framework of the model basially refers to the
primary work of Kydland (1984, 1995). A solution of this model in detail an be obtained from
the author upon request.
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Figures 10 and 11 below present the obtained impulse response funtions of the
wage spread and relative employment. In the ase of a neutral produtivity shok,
the impat on skilled workers is higher than for low skilled workers, whih leads
to the positive response of relative employment (gure 10, solid line). Beause of
the supply eet, whih dereases the marginal produt of skilled workers, wage
inequality responds negatively.
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Figure 10: Model I, Inequality and Employment: neutral shok
Relative employment and the wage spread reat as expeted when biased teh-
nology shoks are onsidered. Figure 11 presents the obtained responses of an unan-
tiipated inrease in tehnology whih either augments the produtivity of skilled
or unskilled workers, respetively.
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Figure 11: Model I, Inequality and Employment: skill-biased shoks
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The eets of the so-alled `low-skill bias' are suggested, for example, by Aghion (2002).
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As shown above, a skill biased tehnology shok leads to an immediate inrease
in relative employment and in wage inequality. The opposite ase is observed for
a low-skill biased advane in tehnology. An interesting result is obtained for the
response of the employment status of low skilled workers after a skill-biased teh-
nology shok (gure 12, below).
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Figure 12: Model I, Low Skilled Employment
As shown above, a skill-biased tehnology shok leads to an immediate inrease
in low skilled employment, however, to a lesser extend than skilled workers. This
response is explained by the immediate relative redution of wages earned by low
skilled workers. This eet is, in priniple, observed for the U.S. labor market during
the 1990's, where skill-biased tehnologial advanes did not has lead to a deline
of low skilled employment.
25
In general, the results are onsistent with the empirial evidenes onerning the
assumption of skill-biased tehnial hange for the U.S. In partiular, the introdu-
tion of a skill-augmenting tehnology leads to a persistent inrease in employment
of skilled workers as well as in wage inequality. However, when the results of gures
9 - 12 are ompared to the empirial ndings (see gures 5-8), the obtained results
do not exhibit a delayed response whih are found empirially. The results of the
model with perfet labor markets an be improved when labor market fritions, as
desribed in setion four, are introdued into the examination.
Figure 13 below presents the obtained responses of output after asymmetri ad-
25
See, for example, Puhani (2005) for a disussion.
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vanes in tehnologial progress.
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Figure 13: Model II, Output responses of Asymmetri Tehnology Shoks
In ontrast to the assumption of perfet labor markets, the response of shows a
delayed response after unantiipated shoks in tehnology. Furthermore, in ontrast
to the results presented in gure 9, the highest response of output is found for a
neutral produtivity shok. In this ase an overall inrease in produtivity leads to
higher job reation and employment for both types of workers. Due to inreases in
investment in physial apital a further inrease in output is determined.
The main dierene in the responses of relative employment between both mod-
els is found for the eets of a neutral produtivity shok. As shown by gure 14,
a neutral produtivity shok leads to an immediate derease of relative employ-
ment. In partiular, this eet oinides with the empirial observation for the U.S.
eonomy (see gure 6). The explanation of this response is that relative employ-
ment dereases beause of the greater availability and lower reruitment osts of
low skilled workers. Furthermore, eah response displays a delayed or hump-shaped
pattern whih is also reported by the empirial ndings.
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Figure 14: Model II, Responses of Relative Employment
When we onsider the eets of asymmetri tehnology shoks on the wage spread
(gure 15) we observe, at rst, that a skill biased tehnology shok leads to the high-
est response of the wage spread. Furthermore, the response of the wage spread is
more persistent than in the model with perfet labor markets where the wage spread
is returned to its steady state level after 23 quarters. For a low skill biased shok
the results are similar as in the model with perfet labor markets (ompare gure
11). In ontrast to the rst model, a persistent inrease in the wage spread is found
for a neutral produtivity shok (gure 15, solid line). In partiular, suh behavior
is found empirially for the German data (see gure 7 right).
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Figure 15: Model II, Responses of Wage Inequality
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When we onsider the eets of tehnologial advanes on the employment pat-
tern of low skilled workers, the reent model displays the highest response of this
variable after a neutral produtivity shok whih inreases the produtivity of both
types of workers. A skill biased tehnology shok does lead to a rather small re-
sponse of low skilled employment, only. At least the responses of a skill biased shok
is more onsistent with the empirial ndings for ontinental European ountries,
where rather low positive responses of the employment pattern of low skilled work-
ers is found during the so-alled IT revolution. Furthermore, within the assumed
searh and mathing framework, rms deide to hire workers when their produtiv-
ity exeeds the rm's searh osts. In the ases of skill or low skill biased shoks the
produtivity gains are not high enough to reah a similar response as after a neutral
shok.
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Figure 16: Responses of low skill employment
In a further step we raise the question whether the models are apable to repro-
due basi fats of the business yle. Table 6 below reports the empirial ndings
for the U.S. and Germany.
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Table 6: Business Cyle Evidenes
U.S., 1964.1-1999.1
relative Correlation of observed Variables
Volatility y  i n
s
n
u
n
s
=n
u
w
s
w
u
w
s
=w
u
y | 1.00 0.81 0.89 0.05 -0.22 0.23 0.37 0.33 -0.04
 0.77 1.00 0.75 -0.01 -0.21 0.51 0.61 0.41 -0.27
i 2.44 1.00 0.02 -0.13 0.13 0.39 0.20 0.02
n
s
0.55 1.00 0.16 0.29 0.10 -0.12 0.27
n
u
1.22 1.00 -0.90 -0.27 -0.54 0.44
n
s
=n
u
1.25 1.00 0.31 0.47 -0.31
w
s
0.95 1.00 0.71 0.15
w
u
1.16 1.00 -0.59
w
s
=w
u
0.82 1.00
Germany, 1973.1-2000.1
y | 1.00 0.78 0.73 -0.28 - 0.24 0.13 0.42 0.51 -0.22
 1.47 1.00 0.62 -0.23 -0.19 0.10 0.27 0.18 0.09
i 2.24 1.00 -0.17 -0.13 0.06 0.33 0.33 -0.06
n
s
0.70 1.00 0.86 -0.45 -0.20 -0.11 -0.02
n
u
1.16 1.00 -0.85 -0.23 -0.18 0.01
n
s
=n
u
0.67 1.00 0.20 0.17 -0.14
w
s
0.22 1.00 0.76 0.27
w
u
0.24 1.00 -0.38
w
s
=w
u
0.16 1.00
In general we observe for both ountries a rather low volatility of skilled workers
(around 2/3 of the volatility of the GDP) and a rather high volatility of low skilled
workers. Furthermore, wages in Germany are rather low volatile ompared to the
U.S. (:40 < :90). An important dierene is observed for the volatility of the wage
spread for Germany a rather stable wage spread is reported whereas we observe a
volatile variable for the U.S..
The simulation results of the two models are reported in table 7 below.
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Table 7: Business Cyle Properties of the Models
Perfet Labor Markets
relative Correlation of simulated Variables
Volatility y  i n
s
n
u
n
s
=n
u
w
s
w
u
w
s
=w
u
y | 1.00 0.72 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.92 -0.89
 0.49 1.00 0.38 0.45 0.38 0.36 0.75 0.78 0.35
i 0.69 1.00 0.95 0.85 0.73 0.87 0.77 0.46
n
s
0.06 1.00 0.68 0.89 0.93 0.69 0.69
n
u
0.02 1.00 0.27 0.66 0.88 -0.06
n
s
=n
u
0.07 1.00 0.81 0.37 0.94
w
s
0.08 1.00 0.84 0.61
w
u
0.07 1.00 0.08
w
s
=w
u
0.01 1.00
Labor Market Fritions
y | 1.00 0.78 0.90 0.80 0.81 -0.07 0.99 0.99 0.30
 0.49 1.00 0.18 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.68 0.65 0.30
i 0.77 1.00 0.96 0.98 -0.06 0.83 0.85 0.19
n
s
0.05 1.00 0.95 0.07 0.71 0.69 0.28
n
u
0.05 1.00 -0.16 0.72 0.77 0.01
n
s
=n
u
0.19 1.00 0.03 -0.13 0.63
w
s
0.07 1.00 0.97 0.42
w
u
0.06 1.00 0.19
w
s
=w
u
0.01 1.00
Comparing the reported orrelations with the empirial ndings, we nd that the
output orrelation of the employment and wages are muh higher than found in the
data, although when labor market fritions are taken into aount the orrelation
between output and employment is lower than in a model without fritions.
Furthermore, we nd a negative orrelation between output and low skilled em-
ployment in the data (table 6) whih is not reprodued by the simulations results,
also the a negative orrelation between employment and wages is not found in the
model. However, the high orrelation of low and high skilled employment whih is
reported by the German data is reprodued in by both models. Also, the model with
searh fritions reprodues the negative orrelation between tehnology and relative
employment found in the German data.
However, when omparing dynami orrelation oeÆients between output, wage
inequality and the relative employment ratio, we observe that the model with searh
fritions displays a delayed orrelation between output and wage inequality and
the relative employment position (see table 8 below). In partiular, this delayed
orrelation is evident for the U.S. and Germany.
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Table 8: Dynami Correlations
Wage Inequality
t  1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t + 4
U.S. -0.14 -0.04 0.09 0.20 0.23
Germany -0.29 -0.22 -0.05 0.17 0.41
RBC -0.86 -0.89 -0.81 -0.74 -0.66
Searh 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30
Relative Employment
t  1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t + 4
U.S. 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.01 -0.22
Germany -0.07 0.13 0.16 0.14 -0.06
RBC 0.91 0.95 0.88 0.81 0.68
Searh -0.11 -0.07 0.06 0.10 0.08
All in all the ability of the models to reprodue some fats of the business yle is
mixed. The model with perfet labor markets partiularly overstates the orrelation
between variables whereas the model with searh fritions understates the variability
as well as the orrelation of some variables. However, the model with searh fritions
is, in general, able to reprodue a delayed orrelation between output and the wage
spread and the relative employment position.
7 Conluding Remarks
Although the apability of the analyzed models to reprodue business yle fats
has to be improved, important insights onerning the transmission proess of teh-
nologial hange under the assumption of labor market fritions and the eets on
employment and wages ould be derived.
In partiular it ould be shown by the omparison of the two models, that rea-
sonable impulse responses, i.e. the delayed response of labor market variables due
to tehnologial innovations, require a ertain degree of labor market imperfetion.
In partiular, labor market institutions prevent the adjustment of wages whih led
to the persistent response of wage inequality in the model with searh fritions.
Conerning the unemployment pattern of low skilled workers, the impliations
of the models are twofold. First, the demand for low skilled labor depends on the
produtivity of skilled workers as well as the eonomi position of the eonomy. Se-
ond, the employment status of low skilled workers an be enhaned due to advanes
in low-skill augmenting tehnology (as well as better shooling, et.), however, the
impat of suh a poliy is aeted by labor market fritions. The results show, that
29
an inrease in the produtivity of low skilled workers generates a higher employment
status of this group in a fritionless eonomy, whereas under labor market fritions
the eets are rather low.
Although, a detailed onsideration of rigid institutions due to high reservation
wages or generous soial benet systems is left for future researh the results of this
paper show a possible way to examine the outomes of tehnologial advanes under
the existene of labor market fritions.
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A Data
 The U.S. unemployment data (gure 2)are taken from the Bureau of labor
statistis (www.bls.gov) and are based on monthly observation. The Ger-
man data are taken from the \Zahlen-Fibel" published by the Institut fur
Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforshung (IAB) (www.iab.de) and are based on an-
nual observations. In the latter ase the quarterly data are obtained from
linear interpolation. For both ountries the quarterly real GDP is taken from
the OCED Main Eonomi Indiators.
 Employment of high and low skilled workers:
Based on annual data for the U.S. and Germany whih are linear interpolated
in order to obtain quarterly data. For the U.S., the data are taken from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1998), Measuring 50 Years of Eonomi Change Using
the Marh Current Population Survey, Current Population Reports P60-203,
Washington DC, September 1998. and U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000),
Current Population Reports P60-209, Money Inome in the United States:
1999, U.S. Government Printing OÆe, Washington D.C.
For Germany, the data are taken from
 Federal Statistial OÆe Germany, Fahserie 1, Bevolkerung und Erwerbstatigkeit,
Reihe 4.2.1, Struktur der Arbeitnehmer, Metzler - Poeshel, Wiesbaden, var-
ious issues sine 1978 and Fahserie 16, Lohne und Gehalter, Reihe 2.2 und
2.1, Metzler - Poeshel, Wiesbaden, various issues sine 1978. See also Greiner
et al. (2004).
 tertiary eduation:
The values for 1980 / 1989 are measured as the proportion of the popula-
tion with a university degree (f. OECD (1993): 172). The 2002 values are
measured as perentage of population (age group 25-64) that has attained a
tertiary type A or an advaned researh program in 2001 (Cf. OECD (2003)).
 wage spread:
Note that the German data refer to the West German manufaturing setor,
only. However, a similar behavior of aggregate wage data is found by Fitzen-
berger (1999). For the U.S. the Data are taken from the CPS and show the
ratio of wages for workers whih some ollege degree to workers with a high
shool degree. For further details see Greiner et al. (2004).
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B Time Series Tests and VAR Speiation
Table 9: Testing for Unit Roots
U.S., 1972.1-1998.4 Germany, 1975.1-2000.1
Deterministi ADF Deterministi ADF
Variable Terms Lags Test Statisti Terms Lags Test Statisti
w
s
=w
u
onstant, trend 2 -2.3544 onstant, trend 2 -3.0549
w
s
=w
u
onstant 1 -4.2355 onstant 1 -2.3139
n
s
=n
u
onstant, trend 2 -4.3566 onstant, trend 2 -2.8551
n
s
=n
u
onstant 1 -6.1377 onstant 1 -4.5677
LP onstant, trend 2 -2.5671 onstant, trend 2 -2.3649
LP onstant 1 -5.3564 onstant 1 -8.4994
v=u onstant, trend 2 -3.3264 onstant,trend 2 -20.5764
v=u onstant 1 -4.8278 onstant 1 -8.1193
MKinnon Critial Values:
1% 5 % 10 %
levels -3.96 -3.41 -3.13
1st. di. -3.43 -2.86 -2.57
The lag length of the VAR models for the U.S. and German eonomies are deter-
mined by using the general information riteria.
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Table 10: VAR Speiations
Variables (interept and linear time trend inluded)
U.S., 1970.1-1998.4 Germany, 1973.1-2000.1
Information w
s
=w
u
w
s
=w
u
riteria n
s
=n
u
n
s
=n
u
LP LP
AIC 10 2
FPE 10 2
HQ 2 2
SC 2 2
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; FPE: Foreast Predition Error;
HQ: Hennan-Quinn; SC: Shwarz Criterion
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A detailed desription of the speiation tests an be found in Lutkepohl (2004):110 ..
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